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INTRODUCTION TO THIS ISSUE OF DICTA ON
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
IN COLORADO
HAROLD E. HURST
Professor, University of Denver College of Law

In Colorado, as in most other states and until recently the
national government, legislative and executive inattention and misunderstanding of administrative organization and procedure have
resulted in the creation of a mass of little independent administrative agencies with wide variations in the procedures by which the
work of the agencies is performed. Confusion and uncertainty
among professional lawyers and laymen is the inevitable result.
During a recent school term,1 the seminar in administrative
law at the University of Denver College of Law, undertook to examine the organization and procedures for administration in Colorado. While limitations on time would not permit complete or
exhaustive study, the reports of the students, some of which are
presented in this issue of Dicta should be instructive to both lawyer
and legislator.
Most apparent conclusion to be drawn from the materials is
that for each new police regulation or tax enacted by the legislature, it has created a new agency of government to administer the
law. And the legislature has included in each act some procedural
requirements to govern the agency. Reference to the list of external control agencies (whose functions directly affect the public)
on pp. 456-460 quickly reveals the number 2 of agencies with statewide jurisdiction which make rules and hold hearings-in lieu,
usually, of a day in court. Perhaps such multiplication of agencies
is necessary. But the lawyer who scans the diverse provisions for
notice, subpoena power, authority to administer oaths and take
testimony, and time and method of getting judicial review of
agency decisions, soon entertains a suspicion that such diversity
is in great measure unnecessary.
But only part of the problem meets the eye in the chart, for
few statutes delineating agency procedure specify the nature of
the pleadings, manner of conducting the hearings, or the applicable rules of evidence. Moreover, only the larger agencies have
published rules, to the great mystification of the lawyer accustomed to well-established and ascertainable rules of procedure for
conducting business before a court. Some of the pitfalls and uncertainties which lie in wait for the practitioner before administrative agencies are set out in the following articles.
'Summer term, 1952.
'It is not pretended that all agencies are listed. Economy of both time and
space dictated omission of a number of agencies, separate divisions of major
agencies (such as the Department of Revenue), or additional functions of listed
agencies for which different procedures are prescribed.
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One is tempted to be critical of laws-and of those who make
them-when the confusion in administrative practice and procedure is brought into focus. But this and the accompanying materials can be of greatest service to the lawyer and citizen simply
by attesting to the present need for reform. Other jurisdictions 8
have led the way out of similar conditions. The success and benefits of standardizing administrative procedure in such jurisdictions are overdue in Colorado.

NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD
ARTHUR BURKE and STEPHEN REED *

When considering the problem of notice and opportunity to
be heard in rule making sessions of administrative agencies, a
preliminary determination must be made of whether the hearing
is, in reality, a legislative or a quasi judicial hearing.
A quasi judicial hearing must: be preceded by notice and affected parties must be afforded an opportunity to be heard. On
the ther hand, in the absence of a statutory requirement, it is
not necessary to give notice to affected parties in a quasi legislative hearing. "And it [an Administrative Agency] is no more
required to give previous notice of an intent to make a regulation
or to grant a hearing on the merits of the regulation to be adopted
than is the legislature in exercising its lawmaking functions."'
The determination of whether a hearing is quasi judicial or quasi
legislative is of primary importance. To fail to give notice and
opportunity to be heard in quasi judicial hearings would be fatal
error and ground for vacating any determination made at this
hearing. On the other hand, a hearing quasi legislative in character
requires no notice.
As a general statement, it may safely be said that in hearings
which are quasi judicial in nature the findings go to a particular
activity in the past. In addition, they are of specific applicability.
"Adjudication is the imposition of a specific duty in personam,
or of a liability, or the granting of a right or status which is dependent on a previous right or duty determined to exist or to2
have existed, or by way of redress or punishment for its violation."
It is immediately seen that there is a necessity for notice and opportunity to be heard. Where an agency is to investigate the
activities of a particular individual or group of individuals and
the result of the hearing is going to be of specific applicability to
3 Federal Administrative Procedure Act, Public Law No. 404, 79th Congress;
Administrative Procedure Act-Legislative History, Senate Document No. 278,
79th Congress; "A Symposium on State Administrative Procedure", 33 Iowa L.
Rev., 372, (1948) ; Heady, F., Administrative Procedure Legislation in the States
(1952).
• Students, College of Law, University of Denver.
'Morgan v. U. S., 298 U. S. 468.
2Morgan
v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 82.
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this or these individuals, the idea of fair play dictates that they
should have an opportunity to rebut the evidence against them.
An exhaustive analysis of the right to notice and opportunity to
be heard in quasi judicial determinations may be found elsewhere
in this issue of Dicta.
Distinctions Between Legislative and Judicial Functions
The quasi legislative function of administrative agencies is
of a different character than the quasi judicial function. This
aspect of an agency's function is generally considered to be of general applicability and of future effect. The language of the courts
vary, but courts use these terms in one way or another. For example: "One if the factors adverted to by the courts in distinguishing legislative from judicial action is the element of futurity
in the first and retrospection in the latter." 3 While rules or regulations may be formulated as a result of conditions known to exist,
and while actions which may violate these rules will be subject
to censure in the future, rules are not promulgated to censure the
past activities. "Legislation, it is said, is the creation by the state
of a right (including an authority, a privilege, or an immunity)
duty or status not dependent on the existence of a previous right,
duty, or status." 4 Another aspect of the futurity of legislative
functions is presented by Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon:5
"Legislation . . . looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied to the future and changes
existing conditions by making a new rule to be applied thereafter
to all or some part of those subject to its power."
The second part of this statement brings us to the second
major distinction between quasi legislative and quasi judicial functions. This is the general applicability of the former and the specific applicability of the latter. If any hearing is to determine an
application to a specific person or persons falling within an arbitrarily drawn class (that is, a class which is not a real or distinct
class based on real differences), then the agency is acting in its
quasi judicial capacity. If, on the other hand, the application is
to all persons or a real class (distinguished on reasonable differences), then the agency is performing a quasi legislative function.
"Legislative and judicial functions have been distinguished by the
element of generality in the former and particularity in the latter,
that is, legislation operates against a class, and judgments against
individuals." 6 There is a valid reason for this distinction. Where
a person's rights are to be determined in a hearing, he must have
every opportunity to protect these rights. There is no problem
involved in allowing him to be present and listening to his arguments on the case. Where a great many persons are involved, it
is usually not feasible to provide all concerned with notice. Further,
" Mitchell Coal and Coke Co. v. Penn. R. Co., 230 U. S. 247.
4115

A. L. :R. 39, n. 3.

253 U. S. 287.
10San Diego Land and Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U. S. 439.
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those who are responsible to the legislature (the agencies) are
going to lend an ear to the demands of fair treatment from a large
group. They are going to take cognizance of the views of a large
body of voters whereas they are not going to be so concerned with
the views of a single voter. The individual must then, of practical
necessity, be protected by a requirement of notice and opportunity
to be heard.
We have seen, then, quasi legislative and quasi judicial functions are distinguished on two grounds: the general applicability
of the former as against the specific of the latter. " . . . legislation
operates against a class and judgments against individuals";7 and
the futurity of the former as against the retrospectivity of the
latter, "Legislative power is the power to make, alter, or repeal
law 8 or rules for the future." 9 "A judicial inquiry investigates,
declares, and enforces liabilities as they stand on present or past
facts and under laws supposed already to exist." 10
Colorado Court Failed to Recognize Distinction
In 1941 the Colorado Supreme Court decided the case of Smith
Brothers Cleaners and Dyers v. People." In that case the defendant was charged with selling its services at less than the established minimum prices, paying its employees less than the minimum
wages, and requiring its employees to work in excess of the established maximum number of hours. Smith Brothers claimed that
the act was unconstitutional in that it violated Sections 3 and 25
of Article II of the Colorado Constitution and Section I of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In effect
Smith Brothers claimed that no notice and opportunity to be heard
was given in the hearing to fix prices, as required by the due process clause. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the Act was a
proper exercise of the police power, and as far as the substantive
jaw was involved the requirements of due process were satisfied.
But then the court fell into error for it held Section 7 of the Act
unconstitutional because it contained no provision requiring notice
and opportunity to be heard.
As said previously, if the application is to all persons or a
real class and concerns future effect, the act is quasi legislative.
The pertinent section of the Act says:
To make investigations and surveys in this State relative to determining the fair and reasonable average cost
for performing the various services regularly performed
by cleaning and dyeing establishments; to submit all
findings together with a schedule of minimum retail and
wholesale prices based upon such fair and reasonable
average costs to the Industrial Commission for approval,
7 Id.

'Spingir v. Philippine Islands, 277 U. S. 189.
Mitchell Coal and Coke Co. v. Penn. R. Co., supra.
10 Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210.
108 Colo. 449, 119 P. 2d 623.
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and, when approved, said minimum retail and wholesale
prices shall be binding on every member of the trade
within this State, in that no member of the trade shall
sell or offer to sell any of the services included in such
minimum price schedule at a price which is lower than
the fair and reasonable average cost as 12
established and
approved in the minimum price schedule.
As previously seen, no notice and opportunity to be heard is
necessary to satisfy the requirements of due process in quasi legislative hearings. 13 It is necessary then to ascertain whether the
hearing setting a minimum price in the Smith Brothers case is
quasi legislative or quasi judicial in nature. Logical reasoning avails
of no answer, except that the hearing setting the price for cleaners
and dyers in Colorado was legislative in nature, and contrary to the
opinion of the Colorado Supreme Court, required no notice and opportunity to be heard. Analyzing the Smith Brothers case in light of
the case of Morgan v. U. S. (supra) there is no pre-existing duty
nor is there an imposition of a liability because of a pre-existing
duty. The hearing determined the duty of a whole class. That is,
there was no specific application, but rather, a general one. There
was, further, no determination of specific past actions. No cleaning and dying establishment was being censured for violation of a
past duty (see Prentiss v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., supra). The
hearing was creating a new duty to affect only the future (see
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon, supra). The hearing in Smith
Brothers was only quasi legislative and, as such, required no notice
or opportunity to be heard.
In considering this problem, however, one is not forced to
rely on only logical analysis. This is ample precedent to sustain
this position. The case relied on by the court in reaching their
decision was Brown v. City of Denver.14 The decision in that case
was correct, but improperly relied upon.
The case of Brown v. City of Denver is readily distinguishable
from Smith Brothers Cleaners and Dyers case. In the Brown case,
the city council passed an ordinance requiring all property owners
to build a sidewalk of certain specifications within sixty days. In
default of their so doing, an authorized contractor was to build a
sidewalk and the city engineer was then to determine the reasonable cost thereof and to levy a- special assessment in this amount
as a fixed charge against the property. This action of the engineer
was a quasi judicial function. It was applied against specific persons
(Those who failed to build sidewalks) and was predicated on past
violation of the law which required property owners to build sidewalks. The court did not hold that notice should be given before the
rules were made, but only before the judicial hearing making the
fixed charge. In so holding the court said:
"Sec. 7, 3 (e) (1), 1937 S. L., p. 425.
"Morgan v. U. S., 298 U. S. 468.
"17 Colo. 305, 3 P. 455.
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Until the walk is built and a certificate therefor issued.., the owner cannot know the grounds of complaint
. . . In so far, therefore, as the ordinance provides for
making the cost of construction a special assessment
against the property improved, and for the manner of
collecting the same without notice or hearing, we are of
the opinion that it is . . .invalid.

The court here implies that the special assessment is judicial in
nature because of the specific applicability, and the assessment
may become final only after a judicial determination. The Smith
Brothers case may be readily distinguished from such an attempt
to create a liability on the basis of an already existing duty. The
regulation in the Smith Brothers case merely created a new duty.
The case of Brown v. City of Denver, in actuality, stands for the
proposition that notice and opportunity to be heard in quasi judicial hearings is necessary. Brown v. City of Denver then, is not
authority for the stand taken in the Smith Brothers case.
Price Fixing As Legislative Function
The Colorado Supreme Court has placed an impossible burden
upon state agencies by its decision in the Smith Brothers case.
The Federal District Court of Virginia said, in upholding a milk
price fixing act:
The act contains no directions as to the kind of notice
to be given and evidently merely contemplated notice by
advertisement to the general public. No other notice was
feasible, considering the large number of persons engaged
in production and distribution of milk. 15
In another milk price fixing case, the New Jersey court said :16
In the absence of a specific constitutional or statutory
requiremeiit thereof, notice of proceedings before the subordinate body exercising, as here, the administrative function is not requisite to valid action by that body. Nor is
a hearing required in the absence of a provision therefor
in the organic or statutory law. The due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no such requirement....
In upholding a minimum wage order, the Washington court
said :17

The legislature instead of fixing the minimum wage
and the conditions of labor for women and minors as it
would clearly have the right to without any notice whatever to persons affected thereby, has authorized a commission to examine into and determine the facts upon
which the Act may become operative. This we are satisfied, may be done without any notice unless notice is required by the Act governing the Commission.

Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 16 Fed. Supp. 575.
" State Board of Milk Control v. Newark Milk Co., 118 N. J. Eq. 504, 179
A. 116.
1"Spokane Hotel Co. v. Younger, 113 Wash. 359, 194 P. 595.
1
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It thus seems that the holding of the Colorado Supreme Court
in the Smith Brothers case was unfortunate because price fixing
is clearly a quasi legislative function 18 and, as such, no notice and
opportunity to be heard are necessary.
As the United States Supreme Court said in Bi-Metallic Co.
v. Colorado:19

Where a rule of conduct applies to more than a few
people it is impracticable that every one should have a
direct voice in its adoption. The Constitution does not
require all public acts to be done in town meeting or on
assembly of the whole ....

There must be a limit to indi-

vidual argument in such matters if government is to go on.

USE OF EVIDENCE IN HEARINGS BEFORE
COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
AL COOTER and ROBERT KELLEY *

It is hardly necessary to call attention to the confusion which
exists with regard to the application of technical rules of evidence
to hearings had before the myriad administrative bodies which
have been created in Colorado. In proceedings before the various
boards, commissions, and agencies there is no homogeneous or
even similar procedure to be followed with regard to the exclusionary rules of evidence. Some of the larger and better known agencies, such as the Public Utilities Commission and the Industrial
Commission, are governed by rather comprehensive statutory requirements which have become well defined by subsequent rules
adopted by these commissions themselves as well as by custom
and prior experience.
Because the list of administrative agencies is continually
growing, the frequency of litigation before these bodies is increasing at a corresponding rate. Adding to that fact the common
knowledge that our society is becoming more and more complex,
the resulting inference is that litigants seeking redress will continue to grow in number, thus presenting an opportunity and a
duty on the part of the bar to provide adequate representation.
In many cases, the individual who has a grievance or who
has been called before one of the agencies for a violation of some
activity within its control will feel that he does not need an attor,3 "Rate making, of course, is a legislative process," Prentis v. Atlantic Coast
Line, 211 U. S. 210, 226; "In the fixing of rates--a legislative act-the legislature has a broad discretion which it may exercise directly or through a legislative agency in accordance with standards prescribed by the legislature," St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38; "Process in the form of a notice
to a corporation to be affected by a contemplated or intended order (as to rate
making) of the commission . . . is neither contemplated nor provided for, ...
nor is essential to the validity thereof," Randall Gas Co. v. Star Glass Co., 88
S. E. 840, 78 W. Va. 252.
"239 U. S. 441.
* Students, University of Denver College of Law.
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ney to represent him because the proceeding is not in a court of
law. For various reasons, this assumption may be correct in a
number of instances. On the other hand, adopting such a premise
may be incorrect, for a hearing before an administrative agency
is quasi judicial in nature, and in some of the larger agencies it
is difficult to discern any difference between the hearing conducted
by them and those instituted before a court of law. Such agencies
as the Industrial Commission and the Public Utilities Commission
conduct their hearings in a room very similar to a court room, the
referee or trial examiner is an attorney, and usually the parties
are represented by attorneys. In view of these facts, it is understandable that hearings of this nature are conducted in much the
same manner as any judicial trial.
In order not to distort the picture and because it is not feasible
for the purposes of this article to present a complete summary of
the similarities and dissimilarities of administrative tribunals as
compared to those of the judiciary, it is thought desirable by
these writers to indulge in a few generalities. Many of the more
than one hundred administrative bodies in Colorado are small in
size and in the scope of their functions, and frequently they are
staffed by only two or three persons. Necessarily, the manner in
which their hearings are conducted may not be analogous to that
of the larger agencies aforementioned. Oftentimes the "courtroom"
of such an agency is composed of a desk and a chair; the hearing
is conducted by a layman, albeit an expert in his administrative
field; and the party litigant is not represented by qualified counsel.
In such a proceeding there is no semblance of a judicial trial. It
does not follow, however, that a party before such an unimpressive
board hearing does not require the services of counsel. He can
as easily be deprived of his liberty or property without due process
of law in such nondescript settings as he can before one of the
more impressive, judicial type agencies; perhaps more so.
It is the underlying theory of administrative law that the
hearings are to be conducted informally, on a non-technical, flexible basis.' As a general rule, administrative agencies conducting
hearings are not bound by the strict or technical rules of evidence
which are employed in jury trials.2 Whether or not a trial examiner will admit or deny the introduction of certain types of evidence
will depend upon the attorney's ability to persuade him that the
rule in Colorado calls for its admission or exclusion. The trick is
to find the rule.
It may be fairly asked, "What, then, is the status of Colorado
law on this aspect of administrative law?"
When an attorney in Colorado is first confronted with a hearing before one of our administrative bodies, he will likely find it
difficult to ascertain with any certainty the existing and controlling law with reference to the presentation of evidence by both
Robert H. Jackson, The Administrative Process, 5 Journal of Social Philosophy 143 (1940).
2 Carrol v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507.
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sides. In his preparation for the hearing, he will find five possible
sources available: (1) 1935 Colorado Statutes Annotated; (2)
Agency-Made Rules of Procedure; (3) Colorado Supreme Court
Decisions; (4) Decisions of Federal Courts and Courts of the
Several States; and (5) the U. S. and Colorado Constitutions.
Each of these sources will be discussed herein.
1935

COLORADO STATUTES ANNOTATED

Using the statutory authority as a starting point, it must be
called to the reader's attention that there is no convenient way
in which to locate agency restrictions or requirements as to evidence. There is no such title as Administrative Law in the statutes.3 Moreover, it is difficult to define the term so that the agencies can be located with any ease or accuracy. Of course, the problem at hand will indicate the subject title to look for in the index.
This fact, however, will most likely be of small value for in very
few of the sections creating agencies is the subject of evidence
mentioned. For example, Ch. 19, "Barbers," Sec. 12, provides that
the Board of Examiners:
* * * shall have power to revoke any certificate of
registration granted by it .. . provided that before any
certificate shall be revoked the holder thereof shall have
notice . . .and . . .be given a public hearing before said
board, and full opportunity to produce testimony in his or
her behalf, and to confront the witnesses against him or
her.
Sec. 24 sets out the same thing in different words. There is nothing in the statute above quoted that specifies the kind or quality
of evidence acceptable in the hearing, although these provisions do
satisfy some of the requirements of procedural due process of law.
As a sidelight, it might be conjectured that perhaps a trial
examiner could be persuaded to follow the statutory provisions
of another agency on the theory that such provisions should logically apply to all agencies because of their similarity of creation
and purpose. To illustrate, the Workmen's Compensation Act of
Colorado 4 provides for a hearing, for notice to be given each interested party, that parties shall have a right to be present at
any hearing in person or by attorney or other agent, and that
they may present pertinent testimony and have the right to cross
examine. It is also provided that:
The Commission may receive as evidence and use as
proof of any fact in dispute the following matters, in addi3There is a subject-head entitled, "Administrative Code," originally enacted
in 1933, subsequently repealed and a new act passed in 1941 replacing it. It
now appears as c. 3 (L. '41, p. 87, sec. 60). This act cannot in any sense of the
word be likened to an administrative procedure act since its scope is restricted
to organization and functions of governmental departments at the state level.
It denominates and describes the powers of the nine administrative departments,
attempting to classify subordinate sub-units, but achieves only partial success.
4 COLO. STAT. ANN., ch. 97, sec. 373 (1935).
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tion to sworn testimony presented at open hearings:
(1) Reports of attending or examining physicians.
(2) Reports of investigators appointed by the Commission.
(3) Reports of employers, including copies of time
sheets, book accounts or other records.
(4) Hospital records in the case of an injured or
deceased employee.
Provided, however, that the Commission may cause
an examination to be made of the person of the injured
employee, or without notice take testimony or inspect the
time books, payrolls or other records of the employer. All
ex parte evidence received by the Commission shall be
reduced to writing and any party in interest shall have
the opportunity to examine and rebut the same by cross
examination or by further evidence.
It is to be noted that the above section is statutory authority
for the admission of hearsay evidence in compensation cases. A
careful search of the statutes failed to reveal any rule about the
exclusion of hearsay or the abolition of the hearsay rule which
was any more enlightening than the Workmen's Compensation Act
above quoted. Accordingly, the Colorado statutes shed very little
light on the question.
AGENCY-MADE RULES OF PROCEDURE

Turning next to the rules promulgated by each agency, it will
be discovered that the problem of evidence has been given some
treatment. The rules of some of the agencies are set out in pamphlet form 5 and are primarily designed to prescribe the methods
employed in the administration of that particular act. For example, the pamphlet prepared by the Public Utilities Commission,
one of the best organized agencies in Colorado, contains the following provision :6
Rule 12-Hearings. (j) Rules of Evidence.
In conducting any investigation, inquiry or hearing,
neither the Commission nor any officer or employee thereof shall be bound by the technical rules of evidence, and
no informality in any proceeding or in the manner of
taking testimony shall invalidate any order, decision, rule
or regulation made, approved or confirmed by the Com'Sec. 2 of the Industrial Commission Law, C. 97, COLO. STAT. ANN. (1935),
provides: It shall be the duty of the Commission, and it shall have the power,
jktrisdiction and authority... to adopt reasonable and proper rules and regulations relative to the exercise of its powers and authority and proper rules to
govern its proceedings and to regulate the mode and manner of investigations
and hearings ....
It shall also cause to be printed in proper form for distribution to the public proper pamphlets showing its orders, regulations and rules
of procedure and shall furnish the same to any person upon application therefore.
. Rules of Practice and Procedure Before the Public Utilities Commission
of thc State of Colorado, effective January 1, 1951. (Decision No. 35628.)

Dec., 1952

DICTA

mission. Rules of evidence before Courts of Record of
the State of Colorado will be generally followed but may
be relaxed in the discretion of the Commission or hearing
officer when deviation from technical rules of evidence
will aid in ascertaining the facts. When objection is made
to the admissibility of evidence, such evidence may be
received subject to later ruling by the Commission. The
Commission, or hearing officer, in its discretion, either
with or without objection may exclude inadmissible evidence or order cumulative or irrelevant evidence discontinued. Parties objecting to the introduction of evidence
shall briefly state the grounds of objection at the time
such evidence is offered. The evidence to be admitted at
hearings shall be material and relevant to the issue.
Certain other of the larger agencies also have available in
pamphlet or mimeographed form, working rules of procedure.
However, the preponderance of smaller administrative bodies have
no such rules in printed form available.
COLORADO SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

Undoubtedly, the best source of law governing the reception
of evidence in an administrative hearing will be the decisions of
the Colorado Supreme Court. Although there are many such decisions wherein the hearing by the Industrial Commission or the
Public Utilities Commission has been reviewed, there are relatively few Colorado cases dealing with the holding of other administrative bodies. Because of this fact, the case law of evidence
is most easily found in the Colorado Digest under the headings of
"Workmen's Compensation," "Public Utilities Commission," etc.
Due to the relative newness of the field of administrative law.
there is no such title as this in the body of the 1937 edition of
the Colorado Digest; however, it does appear in the Cumulative
Supplement to Volume 2. Unfortunately under this title in the
aforementioned 1952 Supplement there are to be found only a few
scattered cases and none under the sub section of "Evidence."
Consequently, it is best to search the sections under specific titles
as suggested above.
The body of administrative case law in Colorado covers such
matters of evidence as hearsay, expert opinion, burden of proof,
competency, weight and credibility and other related matters. Its
decisions pertaining to evidence admissible in an administrative
hearing are not at all uniform. In most cases, for example, the
Supreme Court of Colorado has upheld the exclusion of hearsay,7
but in other cases it has permitted its admission.8 In the case of
Olson-Hall v. Industrial Commission, the refusal of the Commission to admit in evidence a wholly unidentified statement of the
employer respecting a claim of the employee Olson as to the acciOlson-Hall v. Industrial Commission, 71 Colo. 228, 205 P. 527 (1922).
Empire Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, 94 Colo. 98, 28 P. 2d 337 (1933).
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dent and other hearsay evidence was assigned as error. The
court said:
These offers were properly excluded. It is true that
the Workmen's Compensation statutes of most of the
states provide that industrial commissions shall reach
their conclusions without regard to technical rules of
evidence. It is manifest, however, that the rule against
hearsay is not technical, but vitally substantial, and may
not properly be disregarded under such statutory provisions without grave danger of collusion, imposition and
injustice. If a claimant be permitted to make out a case
upon the essential facts of accidental injury upon hearsay
testimony alone there is no limit to the frauds and wrongs
that may be encouraged and made possible. (Italics supplied.)
At first blush, the above decision would seem to lay down the
rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible at all. On closer examination, however, the phrase "hearsay testimony alone" has
the effect of qualifying the rule to the extent of providing that
hearsay is admissible, but it must be fortified by a residuum of
legally sufficient evidence before it will support a finding. This
view is supported by the leading case of Carroll v. Knickerbocker
Ice Co.,9 wherein the court reviewed the sufficiency of hearsay
testimony to support a finding made by the Workmen's Compensation Commission. The statute in that case provided that the Commission was not bound by the common law or statutory rules of
evidence. The finding of the Commission was based solely on the
testimony of witnesses who related what Carroll, the injured employee, told them relative to how he was injured. The court, in
reversing the finding of the Commission said:
The act may be taken to mean that while the Commission's inquiry is not limited by the common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of
evidence, . . . and it may, in its discretion, accept any
evidence that is offered, still in the end there must be a
residuum of legal evidence to support the claim before
an award can be made.
In a later Colorado case 10 the Supreme Court was confronted
with the same question as in the Knickerbocker Ice Co. case, i.e.,
whether there was any competent evidence to support the Industrial Commission's finding that the deceased employee had been
injured in an accident arising out of or in the course of his employment. The Commission had admitted hearsay evidence in the
form of a written report of the accident by the employer and the
State Mine Inspector's report to the Commission, together with
evidence of the fact that the employer had notified the Commission that it had paid the funeral benefits. Contrary to the OlsonHall and Knickerbocker cases, the court affirmed the Commission's
9218 N. Y. 435, 113 N. E. 507.
"Empire Zinc Co. v. Industrial Commission, supra, n. 8.
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finding and said :11
That the company report, the conduct of the company,
and the report of the mine inspector, were proper evidence
in the hearing before the Commission seems clear. That
these supported a finding that the accident arose out of
and in the course of the employment, notwithstanding the
testimony of Medina (an eye witness) and that we are
without power to interfere therewith, are equally clear.
The language of the preceding decision raises the question of
what is necessary to constitute proper and sufficient evidence. Of
course, the appellate court can do no more than consider and
decide whether the decision of the agency is supported by sufficient and proper evidence. The Colorado Supreme Court has uniformly held, "that findings of the Industrial Commission as to
facts must be accepted by the courts if there is any substantial
evidence to support them." 12 The court in American Mining Co.
v. Zupet,13 stated:
The matter of determining the probative effect of
evidence in such cases, where there is a conflict, still remains exclusively with the Commission where there is
evidence for its consideration or from which it could
draw a reasonable inference.
Supreme Court decision, Stork ResAs was stated in a New 1York
4
taurant, Inc. v. Boland :
A finding is supported by the evidence only when the
evidence is so substantial that from it an inference of
the existence of the fact found may be drawn reasonably.
A mere scintilla of evidence sufficient to justify a suspicion is not sufficient to support a finding upon which
legal rights and obligations are based. That requires
"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
Our Colorado Supreme Court has used similar language in stating, "that expert medical testimony given in a hearing before the
Industrial Commission constitutes substantial, credible evidence." 15
Likewise, in C. S. Card Iron Works Co. v. Radovich,16 the court
held that opinion evidence of physicians is competent in Workmen's Compensation cases.
However, the Supreme Court felt that expert medical testimony in the case of U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Industrial
Commission 17 was not competent evidence. Therein, three doctors
testified as to the cause of claimant's heart attack to the effect that:
The excitement may have been a precipitating factor.
Ibid.
2 Zuzich v. Leyden Lignite Co., 120 Colo. 21, 206 P. 2d 833.
Colo. 283, 72 P. 2d 281.
14 282 N. Y. 256, 26 N. E. 2d 247 (1940).
SkJoldahl v. Industrial Commission, 108 Colo. 140, 113 P. 2d 871.
94 Colo. 426, 30 P. 2d 1108.
"122 Colo. 31, 219 P. 2d 315 (1950).
13101
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. . I don't know ....
It is a possibility. I couldn't say
absolutely but I guess statistically probably more infractions occur when people are lying quietly in bed than when
they are exerting themselves but it is quite within the
realm of possibility. (Emphasis supplied by the court.)
The court said the findings in favor of the claimant were unwarranted and could not be sustained. "A resort to mere conjecture
of possibilities will not take the place of direct or circumstantial
evidence. No number of mere possibilities will establish a probability."
Thus, as to the competency of expert opinion evidence, it is
apparent that it is admissible for what it is worth. Even though
administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of
evidence, a court in reviewing a decision of such an agency must
look for convincing evidence of a substantial and credible nature.
*

DECISIONS OF FEDERAL COURTS AND COURTS OF THE SEVERAL STATES

The value of citing decisions of the federal courts and courts
of the several states is not peculiarly affected by the fact that
they are based on a review of an administrative hearing. In other
words, this source of authority is usable in the same manner as
it is in the review of a judicial trial. The only point of interest
is that this source is extremely large and diversified in comparison to that of Colorado cases alone. Of course, care must be taken
to distinguish the cases which are based on statutory provisions,
or,
in
. Act.
se of federal decisions, on.
Federal Administrative
Procedure
THE UNITED STATES AND COLORADO CONSTITUTIONS

As a source of authority the constitutions are limited to the
requirement of due process of law. Due process requires, among
other things, that there be an opportunity to be heard and a
finding in accord with the evidence. Therefore, if the creating
statute failed to provide for a hearing, or if a party were deprived
of the right to a hearing and to present evidence on his own behalf,
a defense could be interposed that the statute or agency action
was unconstitutional in that it deprived the party of his property
without due process of law.
Moreover, the requirement that there be a finding in accord
with the evidence presupposes that there is some "substantial evidence" upon which the finding is predicated. Thus, under the
aforementioned views of the Colorado Supreme Court, a decision
based solely on hearsay and not buttressed by any legal evidence
would seemingly fall within this interdiction and therefore not
be a finding in accord with the evidence as required by the due
process clauses of the respective constitutions.
CONCLUSION

From the above discussion, it is submitted that the method
of discovering the applicable law pertaining to the use of evi-
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dence before administrative agencies in Colorado is not clear-cut
or simple. Therefore, in view of the increasing number and complexity of administrative agencies in this state, it is submitted
that the adoption by the Legislature of an administrative code of
procedure would create desirable and much needed uniformity and
simplicity. Such a code has been adopted in some of the other
states and by the federal government.
The Model State Administrative Procedure Act was approved
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws at its 1946 Session. It represents an effort of the legal profession "to standardize by statute the practices and principles of
administrative agencies which adjudicate or make rules." IS Pertaining to evidence, sec. 9 provides:
In contested cases:
(1) Agencies may admit and give probative effect to
evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their
affairs. They shall give effect to the rules of privilege
recognized by law. They may exclude incompetent, irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious evidence.
(2) All evidence, including records and documents
in the possession of the agency of which it desires to
avail itself, shall be offered and made a part of the record
in the case, and no other factual information or evidence
shall be considered in the determination of the case. Documentary evidence may be received in the form of copies
or excerpts, or by incorporation by reference.
(3) Every party shall have the right of cross-examination of witnesses who testify, and shall have the right
to submit rebuttal evidence.
(4) Agencies may take notice of judicially cognizable facts and in addition may take notice of general, technical, or scientific facts within their specialized knowledge. Parties shall be notified either before or during
hearing, or by reference in preliminary reports or otherwise, of the material so noticed, and they shall be afforded
an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed. Agencies
may utilize their experience, technical competence, and
specialized knowledge in the evaluation of the evidence
presented to them.

COLORADO REPORTS NEEDED
Two new District Court divisions were authorized for Denver
by the 1952 General Assembly and will be in service within the
month. Complete sets of the Colorado Reports and Colorado Appeals are urgently needed for these courts. Anyone knowing where
such sets may be available should contact J. B. Goodman, Jr.,
clerk of the Denver District Court, at once. The search for these
volumes deserves a special effort on the part of the bar.
18 GFLLIHORN, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW

1119 (1947).
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RIGHT OF CROSS EXAMINATION BEFORE
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES IN
COLORADO
WESLEY H. DOAN*

There is, in the Colorado Constitution, no article or provision
which specifically provides for cross examination in hearings before Colorado administrative agencies. However, this right may
be inferred from the due process clause of the Constitution,' and
it is a right which is zealously guarded by the courts with regard
to both judicial proceedings and proceedings before administrative agencies.
Colorado is among those states which allow the administrative agencies to use their own prerogative in adoption of the common law rules of procedure. There is very little statutory or case
law upon the subject of cross examination and rebuttal before
administrative agencies in Colorado. However, from what the author was able to ascertain from the reported cases on the subject,
it appears that the agencies and the courts will protect this fundamental right.
Statutory Recognition of Right
In the establishment of the Workmen's Compensation Commission in Colorado, the legislature provided for cross examination
in hearings before the Commission. In the section entitled Rules
of Evidence-Procedure 2 it is provided that:
Such commission or persons by it duly designated,
shall not be bound by the usual common law or statutory
rules of evidence or by any technical or formal rules of
procedure other than herein or by the rules of the commission provided, but may make such investigations in
such manner as in its judgment are best calculated to
ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to
carry out justly the spirit of this article.
This section shows the power of the Commission to set its own
rules of procedure. However, in Hearings-Notice-EvidenceOrder,3 it is provided that:
Either party shall have the right to be present at
any hearing [and] . . . shall have the right of cross examination ....
All ex parte testimony shall be reduced to
writing and either party shall have opportunity to rebut
the same in final hearing.
Statutory authority establishing the right of cross examination and rebuttal in hearings before the Public Utilities Commission is set out in the article which sets up the Commission.4 It is
* Student, University of Denver College of Law.

Colorado Constitution, Art. II, sec. 25.
1935 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 97, sec. 24.
1 Op cit., sec. 37.
4 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 137, sec. 46.
I
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there stated that:
At the time fixed at any hearing before the commission, any commissioner or examiner, or at the time to
which the same may have been continued, the applicant,
petitioner, complainant, the person, firm or corporation
complained of, such persons, firms, or corporations as the
commission may allow to intervene and such persons,
firms, or corporations as may be interested in or affected
by any order that may be made by the commission in such
proceedings shall be entitled to be heard, examine and
cross-examine witnesses and introduce evidence. . . . All
persons shall be entitled to be heard in person or by
attorney.
Thus it may be seen that there exists statutory right to cross
examination and rebuttal in hearings before two of the largest
and most important commissions in the state.
JudicialProtection of Right in Colorado
The Colorado Supreme Court has, in the cases before it on
the subject, protected this right. In Denver & S. L. R. Co. v. Chicago B. & Q. R. Co.,5 a rate making case before the Public Utilities
Commission, the court stated:
The commission is an administrative body, and where
it acts in a quasi-judicial capacity it is not limited by the
strict rules as to the admissibility of evidence which prevail in suits between private parties." "But the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, the more imperative the delegation to preserve the rules of evidence
by which rights are asserted and defended." All parties
must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or to be
considered, and must be given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence
in explanation or rebuttal. In no other way can a party'
maintain its rights or assert its defenses.
In Snell v. Public Utilities Commission,7 another case before
the Public Utilities Commission of Colorado, the court protected
the right of presenting evidence in rebuttal. The plaintiff carrier
applied to the commission for a permit to operate certain sightseeing busses. A hearing was held and intervenors appeared in
protest to the issuance of the permit. The permit was granted
with no limitation as to the number of vehicles to be used. A
petition for a rehearing was filed, and in oral arguments on the
petition it was denied, but at the same time and in the same order
denying the petition for rehearing, the commission purported to
amend and modify the previous order. The court held that the
64 Colo. 229, 171 P. 74.
0 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U. S. 25;
Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & Nashville Ry Co., 227
U. S. 88.
T108 Colo. 162, 114 P. 2d 563.
5
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orders of the commission must be just and reasonable and in accordance with the evidence. If the modified order had been allowed
to stand, it would have in effect denied the petitioners the right
to cross examine the evidence from which the commission modified
its original order or to present evidence in rebuttal to it. The
carrier would have been denied due process as a consequence. In
a round-about way the court upheld these rights of the petitioner.
The court found that such action was unjust and unreasonable.
In a proceeding wherein an unusual result was reached by
the commission, the state was held to have been denied the opportunity to rebut a change of mind by the Workmen's Compensation
Commission in the Allen case.8 In a personal injury action before
the commission, a hearing was held and an award made. In seven
hearings on a petition for review which extended over a period
of four years, the commission consistently held that the petitioner's physical condition had not changed and the original award
stood as ordered. Then in another hearing the commission entered
another award stating: "on prior reviews it improperly weighed
the evidence herein, and its previous order should be set aside."
Upon this change of mind additional compensation was awarded.
The Supreme Court of Colorado on a review of the case held that:
[T]o enter the award above set out upon the simple
statement that the evidence had been improperly weighed,
and to do so without additional hearings or evidence, and
this upon the heels of consistent contrary findings establishes with crystal clearness that the prohibited change
of mind occurred without stated reasons.
To allow the second award to rest upon a mere change of mind
would have deprived the state of the opportunity to rebut the
findings or cross examine the opposing evidence that might have
been presented in a proper hearing.
Although the reported law in Colorado is very meager and
inadequate for a complete analysis of the subject, it is felt that
the courts and administrative agencies of Colorado will follow the
trend of the federal and state agencies in other jurisdictions and
continue to protect the right of cross examination and rebuttal in
proceedings before them. For an analysis of the situation in the
various states, see an article in the Minnesota Law Review, 9 and
also one in the Harvard Law Review. 10
In a case before the Federal Communications Commission 11
which involved the issuance of a license to a broadcasting station
in competition with one already existing, the question of the admissibility of hearsay testimony was involved. The hearsay evidence admitted consisted of the testimony of the applicant as to
'Allen v. Gadbois, 100 Colo. 141, 66 P. 2d 331.
'Hoyt, Some PracticalProblems Met in the Trial of Cases Before AdminislIrative Tribunals, 25 Minn. L. Rev. 545 (1941).
"Ross, Rules of Evidence Before Commissions, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 263 (1922-

23).

"Tri-State Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 68.
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his talks with a large number of people who told him that another
station would be very beneficial and that they would support it
financially. The court held that while the commission was not
limited to the strict rules of evidence, the admission of the hearsay
testimony in question was improper because it deprived the opposing party of the right to cross examine those persons whose composite views the applicant was reflecting into the record.
With regard to the admissibility of hearsay evidence under
the rules of commissions which do not follow statutory or common
law rules of evidence and procedure, it would seem that if the parties are given the opportunity to cross examine and to present
evidence 12in rebuttal, the requirements of a fair trial have been
satisfied.
What Constitutes Denial of Right?
The right to cross examine an opposing witness is a substantial part of the guaranty of a fair trial. The general theory of
what constitutes an infringement of one's rights is clear. The
agency is not permitted to accept as evidence anything which is
devoid of evidential value, and the party concerned must be given
a fair opportunity to demonstrate the unreliability of the proffered proof. The general test is well phrased in the Federal Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 1? (in case of certain proceedings
before federal agencies), where recognition is given to the right
"to conduct such cross examination as may be required for a full
and true disclosure of the facts."
If a letter, affidavit, or report is admitted as a substitute for
the oral testimony of an individual witness as to what he has seen
or believes, the other14party must be given the opportunity to cross
examine the author.
Similarly where the only means of attacking the accuracy of
the proffered testimony is by cross examination of the author, that
opportunity must be offered.15 Again where the credibility of the
author is in issue, the opportunity of cross examination must be
afforded.
Where the testimony relates to specific factual disputes at
issue in a particular case, cross examination is more generally insisted upon than in cases where the testimony relates to matters
of general information. Where an agency desires to rely on reports filed by a large number of disinterested parties, gathered in
the course of a general investigation; the rights intended to be
protected by cross examination can ordinarily be safeguarded so
long as the affected party is given full opportunity to rebut the
prima facie showing made by the reports. Impracticability of call12 Case Comment,

Crimes-Improper Conduct of Prosecuting Attorneys. 24

Mich. L. Rev. 834 (1925-26).

"Sec. 7 (c).

14 Bereda Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Board of Ill., 275 Ill. 514, 114 N. E. 275
(1916).
g U. S. v. Baltimore & 0. Southwestern R. Co., 226 U. S. 14, 33 S. Ct. 5
(1912).
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ing a large number of witnesses makes it unwise to insist upon a
literal application of the general right of cross examination. In
cases where the agency's function is legislative or executive rather
than judicial, of course the right of cross examination does not
exist.
The Model Act provides that "every party shall have the right
of cross examination of witnesses who testify." The Wisconsin
act says that "every person shall be afforded adequate opportunity
to rebut or offer countervailing evidence." Since the act states
that the agencies "shall not be bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence," it would appear that agencies could allow
written evidence to be introduced without cross examination of
the author. In Missouri, the Bar Bill authorizes the cross examination of the author of an affidavit, but does not guarantee it.
In North Dakota, the statute provides for the same opportunity to cross examine witnesses "as is permitted to parties in an
action in the district court." This seeming assurance of an opportunity for cross examination of authors of written evidence is
weakened by the power given to the agency to waive the usual
common law or statutory rules of evidence.
In California the problem has been carefully considered. As
it now stands, any party proposing to introduce an affidavit in
evidence shall so notify the opposing party, who may demand cross
examination of the affiant. If not demanded within a specified time,
the right of cross examination is waived. Even if the affidavit is
not produced for cross examination after request is made, it may
still be introduced in evidence, but "shall be given only the same
effect as other hearsay testimony." 16
The conventional objection to hearsay is that it cannot be
subjected to cross examination, but that mode of testing evidence
generally serves only to reveal the imperfections without exposing
the falsehoods of testimony given on direct examination, therefore
there is a greater tendency on the part of administrative agencies17
to allow such evidence to come in than is allowed in the courts.
Formal hearings before the Federal Communications Commission are governed by the rules of evidence which govern civil
proceedings in the courts of the United States, but the commission
retains the right to relax such rules if, in its discretion, justice
will thereby be served. In the administration of radio regulations,
this rule seems proper since the trier of facts is expert in deciding the probative force of the evidence presented, and it is therefore capable of exercising a discrimination
which the normal jury
18
could not be expected to possess.
Evidence Not Contained in Official Record
The Supreme Court of the United States and the state courts
are virtually unanimous in their condemnation of the practice by
1611 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 545.
"Heady, Administrative Procedure Legislation in the States (1952).
SNote, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 1333 (1936).
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the administrative tribunals of giving consideration to evidence
not contained in the official record to which all parties have access.
The Supreme Court of the United States has taken a firm position
on this question beginning with the earlier cases coming to it from
the Interstate Commerce Commission. In S. C. C. v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 19 wherein it was sought to sustain an order of
the Commission on the basis of information gathered outside of
the hearing, the court said:
Manifestly, there is no hearing when the party does
not know what evidence is offered or considered and is
not given an opportunity to test, explain or refute it....
All parties must be fully apprised of the evidence submitted or considered and must be given an opportunity
to cross examine witnesses and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal. In no [other] way can a party
maintain its rights or make its defenses.
This language was approved by the Supreme Court of Colorado in Denver and S. L. R. Co. v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 20 Other
state courts have consistently taken the same position. The Supreme Court of Illinois, in a railroad case, 21 said:
The commissioners cannot act on their own information. Their findings must be on evidence presented in
the case, with an opportunity to all parties to know of the
evidence to be submitted or considered, to cross examine
witnesses, to inspect documents, and to offer evidence in
explanation or rebuttal, and nothing can be treated as
evidence which is not introduced as such.
The Supreme Court of Arizona has permitted the commissioners to allow their examiners to make an ex parte investigation after
a hearing on a Workmen's Compensation case and thus obtain
information which the commissioners refused to allow the petitioners to see.2 2 The court held that the validity of the commissioners' award against the petitioner was not affected by this practice so long as there was in the official record competent evidence
in support of the award. The court stated that "the reports of
such special examiners are not themselves evidence, but are merely
in the nature of confidential information from which the commission may secure legal and competent evidence." It seems that the
court was somewhat confused in this case as to what evidence was.
In an earlier Illinois case, a contrary result was reached when
the commission frankly stated that it was unable to determine
which way the preponderance of evidence lay and sent out its
investigators to obtain ex parte affidavits from additional witnesses. The Supreme Court reversed the resulting award, stating
that the parties had the right :23
19 227

U. S. 88
1064 Colo. 229,
"Atchison, T.
831, 837 (1921).
"Simpkins v.
" Bereda Mfg.

(1913).
171 P. 74 (1918). See also Comp. L., 1921, ch. 79, sec. 4346.
& S. F. R. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 335 Ill. 624, N. E.
State Banking Dept., 45 Ariz. 186, 42 P. 2d 47.
Co. v. Industrial Board of Ill., op. cit.
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* , .not only to present such evidence as they may
desire, but also to be present at the taking and hearing
of evidence by the opposing party so that each may have
opportunity for the cross examination of the other's witnesses.
The courts approve of the use of ex parte evidence and expect
investigations as long as the rights of cross examination and rebuttal are allowed. 24 In the Lindsey case, the court held that such
reports as those of the commission's own engineers "are in the
nature of evidence and are, like any other evidence, subject to
analysis and impeachment, and if an application to examine the
report or the authors had been refused, it would be reversible
error."
The remedy of the aggrieved party when agencies do take
ex parte testimony is rather illusory. It is generally held that
members of an administrative body cannot be called to the witness stand and be cross examined as to their processes in deciding
the case,25 so that the opportunity of the aggrieved party to bring
a suspected violation to the attention of a reviewing court, is really
very meager.
An Appraisal of the Right of Cross Examination
The common law considers the examination of an adverse witness so essential to the elucidation of truth that it does not permit
offered testimony to be considered as evidence until opportunity

has been h-ad' -For cross exa-mination. Consequently the courts regard
the right to cross 26examine at administrative hearings one to be
zealously guarded.
In FarmersElevator Co. v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co. 27 where
the Public Utilities Commission ordered the railroad to make certain connections and where part of the evidence was obtained by
ex parte investigations, the court said:
[A] llowing the testimony to be heard by the commission or one of its members without any opportunity
to cross examine the witnesses presenting it, amounts to
a practical denial of the vital part of the hearing required
by this statute. The words 'public hearing' before any
tribunal or body, by the accepted definition of lexicographers and courts, mean the right to appear and give evidence, and also the right to hear and examine witnesses
whose testimony is presented by opposing parties.
An order of this nature must be based upon the evidence presented in the public hearing, with a full opportunity to cross exSaratoga Springs v. Saratoga Gas, Electric Light and Power Co., 191 N. Y.
123, 83 N. E. 693 (1908);
Lucas v. Walters Milling Co., 116 Pa. Super 171, 176 A. 78 (1935)
Lindsey v. Public Utilities Commissioners, 144 N. E. 729, 111 Ohio St. 6
(1924).
1Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 18 (1936).
80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 878, 884 (1932).
27 266 Il. 567, 107 N. E. 841, 843 (1915).
24

21Note,
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amine the witnesses and to present, if desired, evidence in rebuttal
and may not be founded upon ex parte examination. "The fundamental right to a fair hearing is determined from the character
of the proceedings." 28 It is denied in such cases as permit unsworn
testimony, deny cross examination, or promulgate orders on the
basis of facts not received in evidence.
Experience in the conduct of all types of procedure indicates
the value of cross examination as an aid in separating the gold
from the dross of testimony. The adverse party always has a more
active interest in narrowing the facts than does the presiding
tribunal, and is usually armed with some information not known
to the tribunal as an aid in cross examination. To deny this right
is to deny fair hearing and to impede rather than assist the agencies in determining facts.
If, in any hearing, rules of evidence are disregarded, they are
not necessarily violated. Lawyers usually aid commissions without raising questions of admissibility of evidence and aid tribunals
in correctly appraising any kind of evidence received. While cross
examination is used for particular purposes, nevertheless it materially aids in the ascertainment of the truth because it brings
out the remaining and qualifying circumstances of testimony given
on direct examination. "Confrontation and the right to cross examine, explain or refute are necessary." 29
The Colorado courts have in the past, and should continue in
the future to protect the essential rights of cross examination and
rebuttal before administrative agencies in order that all the elements of a fair proceeding may be maintained.

COMPARATIVE PROCEDURAL PRACTICES OF
COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
LEONARD T. HOWARD *
of the Nevada Bar

On the following pages are charts that indicate the number
and variety of agencies through which the State of Colorado operates its state government. These charts are not intended to be
nor are they a compilation of all state agencies but are rather a
study of those agencies that deal directly with the people (external
in nature). The state operates many other agencies whose duties
are purely of an internal nature and whose only concern is carrying on the functions of government as such. These latter agencies
are not herein considered.
Due to the complexity of our state government, it is imperative that many of its necessary functions be delegated to agencies
Is The Extent to Which Fact-FindingBoards Should Be Bound By the Rules
of Evidence, 24 A. B. A. 63'0, 633 (1934).
2' Gauthier v. Penobscot Chemical Fiber Co., 113 A. 28 (1921).
* Written while a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
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that are charged with the responsibility of carrying out particular
phases of the state's powers. Our changing economy both on a
national and regional level dictates that new agencies be created
as the occasion demands and inversely that obsolete agencies must
be abandoned.
Even a casual glance at the following charts discloses the
enormous amount of variance among the several agencies as to
their powers, procedural practices, and especially in the appeal
provisions. Many of the agencies have been given broad general
powers by the legislature without a delineation of procedures to
be followed.
It is the purpose of this analysis to exemplify the confusion,
waste of time, energy, and effort, not to mention the expense of
the present practices and procedures of many of these state agencies that are currently being operated under antiquated methods
of the nineteen twenties.
A study of the practice and procedures of one agency has
been completed through the cooperation of that agency to indicate
the variety of procedures under which separate departments of
the same agency are forced to operate due to the various state
statutes involved. The Department of Revenue is the agency under
consideration. It was created by the Administrative Act of 1941
for the purpose of placing under one department of government
the responsibility for collection of state funds. Although many
licenses and other taxes are collected by this agency, the study
of the three major items of sales tax, income tax, and motor fuel
tax is sufficient for the purpose of this analysis. The present procedures and practices of this agency in the collection and administration of these taxes will be discussed.
There is diversity from the initial step of each of the three
divisions in sending a notice of a deficiency in the amount of tax
due. The income tax letter is entitled "Notice of Deficiency." The
sales and use tax letter is entitled "Deficiency Assessment" and
the motor fuel tax letter is "Notice and Demand." The income tax
notice contains the requirement that a protest to the notice of
deficiency must be filed in duplicate within thirty days from the
date of the letter. The sales and use tax letter contains the statement that the amounts claimed to be due to the state will become
due and payable ten days from the date of the letter. The motor
fuel tax letter contains a ten day period for filing a protest. The
state legislature in 1951 attempted to iron out some of the discrepancies by Senate Bill No. 141 which was intended to change
the motor fuel tax so as to conform more closely to the law of
the income tax.
From this original point of discrepancy the breach against
uniformity continues to widen. Assuming that a protest within
the prescribed period has been made by the taxpayer, his next
step would be determined by the particular tax involved and will
vary with the type of tax in dispute. Under the income tax law,
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this protest entitles the taxpayer to a formal hearing before the
Director of Revenue although there are usually one or two informal
hearings with the supervisor of the income tax division in an
attempt to settle the dispute at that level if possible. If the Director's decision is adverse to the taxpayer, he has the right to
appeal the decision to the district court for the county in which
the taxpayer resides which then hears the case de novo. Under the
sales and use tax law, the Director has the authority to hold hearings and to make findings of fact as to taxes due. The taxpayer
may appeal only to the district court for the City and County of
Denver which does not try the case de novo but reviews the findings of the Director by writ of certiorari. In the case of a motor
fuel tax deficiency the statutes do not provide for any hearings
by the Director although in actual practice informal hearings are
held. The taxpayer, in order to have his side of the controversy
heard, must bring an action in the district court within thirty
days from the date of the notice of deficiency. The same director
of the same agency must use these different methods to accomplish
the same end. Likewise a taxpayer must analyze the necessary
procedures to follow as each tax problem occurs in order to make
a valid protest of the assessment and protect his interest.
Further useless differentiation is incorporated in the distraint
and sale proceedings that the agency must abide by in the forced
collection of taxes due the state. Currently there is no statute of
limitation on the collection of deficient motor fuel taxes. The sales
tax statute of limitation was added to the original act a few years
ago, while the income tax statute has had such a provision for
many years.
The situation continues to become progressively worse as new
legislation creates new agencies or adds other duties to the current agencies. For example, if a severance tax were to be passed
by the legislature during this next session, it would necessarily
have to draft a complete law in all details for its administration
and enforcement. The new tax law must include procedures for
hearings, powers to be given the collection agency, distraint and
sale provisions, and appeal procedures. No doubt this new tax
law and its procedures would differ from those already considered
here and therefore would add to the entanglement and confusion.
Colorado has an urgent need for a long overdue Uniform Enforcement Code applicable to all state agencies which have external
functions to perform. Not only should it outline the procedures
for enforcement so as to simplify the work of the state agencies
and taxpayers, but such a code would be a direct saving of the
legislature's time and effort in the enactment of new legislation.
The reader should bear in mind that the three taxes used for
the purposes of illustrating this need are administered by the
same state agency. A study of the following chart will show how
these differences are multiplied in the comparison of entirely
separate agencies.
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COLORADO ADMINISTRATIVE

STATE AGENCY

'35 C.S.A.
(Chapter)

Aeronautics Comm ...................................................
17
Banking Comm'r .-........................................
*.........
*18
........ Interest and Money Lenders ............................
88
Building and Loan Comm'r.....................................
25
Civil Service Comm ..................................................
36

Game and Fish Comm ...............................................

73

Functions:
(Quasi-Legtn.
or
Quasi-Jud.)

Both
Quasi-Legis.
Both
Both
Both

Both

Director, Game and Fish Dept.................................
73
Quasi-Jud.
Industrial Comm .......................................................
97
Both
........ Factory and Boiler Insp'rs ...............................
97, Art. 2
Quasi-Jud.
........ Labor Peace Act ................................................
97, Art. 2
Both
........ Wage Claim Court ............................................
97, Art. 6
Quasi-Jud.
-Workmen's
Compensation Act ........................ 97, Art.7
Both
Dept. of Employment Security ................................ 167A
Both
Insurance Comm'r .....................................................
87
Both
Board of Land Comm'rs ...........................................
134
Both
Bureau of Mines ........................................................
110
Both
Oil and Gas Conservation Comm ........................... 118
Both
Pub. Utilities Comm. (Carriers) ............................
16
Both
re:
-in Public Utility Rates .............................. 137
Both
Dept. of Public Welfare ..........................................
119
Both
Board of Public Welfare ..........................................
141
Both
Relief Commission ....................................................
141
Quasi-Legis.
Sec. of St.-Collection Agency Bd ......................... 37
Both
........ Intoxicating Liquors ........................................
89
Both
-Ore
Buyers' License .......................................... 110
Quasi-Legis.
Abstractors' Bd. of Examiners ..............................
2
Both
Accountancy Examining Bd .....................................
2A
Both
Bd. of Barber Examiners -----------------.................... -19
Both
Bd. of Examiners of Basic Sciences ...................... 109
Both
Chiropractors' Examining Bd .................................
34
Both
Bd. of Dental Examiners -------------------------------------52
Both
Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalm-----------------60
Both
Bd. of Medical Examiners ........................................ 109
Both
Motor Vehicle Dept ...................................................
16
Both
Bd. of Optometric Examiners .................................. 120
Both
Board of Pharmacy ....................................................
58
Both
Real Estate Brokers' Exam. Bd .............................
15
Both
Bd. of Veterinary Examiners .................................. 171
Quasi-Jud.
Agricultural Comm ...................................................
5
Both
Comm'r. of Agriculture ............................................
106
Both
Dairy Com 'r ...............................................................
49
Both
Director of Markets ................................................
15
Both
Dept. of Health ..........................................................
78
Both
Board of Health ..........................................................
78
Quasi-Jud.
Colo. Tax Comm .........................................................
142
Both
Director of Revenue (Income Tax) ...................... 84A
Both
........ (Sales Tax) ---------------------------------------------------144
Both
(Motor
-------Fuels Tax) ............................................
16
Both
Motor Vehicle Dealers' Adm ..................................
78, L. '45
Both
Inheritance Tax Comm'r ...........................................
85
Both
Bd. of Standards of Child Care ..............................
33
Both
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Hearings
Recorded ?

Procedural
Rule Making
Power?

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
....

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

*Through District Court.

Conducts
Hearings?

Notice
Required?

15 days
10 days
10 days
due notice
due notice
20 days
40 days
10 days
10 days
newspaper
reasonable
11 days
varies
"duly advise"
due notice
10 days
20 days
10 days
reasonable
20 days
30 days
30 days
due notice
15 days
due notice
30 days
due notice
30 days
30 days
30 days
10 days
reasonable
"notice required"
varies
varies

Power of
Subpoena?

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes*
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes*
Yes
Yes

10 days
"notice required"
30 days
10 days
20 days
"adequate"
"notice required"

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
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State Agency

Power to Give Oaths
and Take Testimony

Period for
Appeal

Both

20 days

Aeronautics Comm...................................................
Banking Comm'r ......................................................
........ Interest and Money Lenders ...........................
Building and Loan Comm'r .........................................
Civil Service Com m .......................................................
Game and Fish Comm .............................................
Director, Game and Fish Dept ..............................
Industrial Com m ...........................................................
........ Factory and Boiler Insp'rs .................................
........ Labor Peace A ct ....................................................
........ W age Claim Court ................................................
Workmen's
........
Compensation Act ............................
Dept. of Employment Security .............................
Insurance Com m 'r .........................................................
Board of Land Comm'rs ...............................................
Bureau of Mines .......................................................
Oil and Gas Conservation Comm.............
Pub. Utilities Comm. (Carriers) ................................
........ in re: Public Utility Rates ..................................
Dept. of Public W elfare ..............................................
Board of Public W elfare ..............................................
Relief Com mission ........................................................
Sec. of St.-Collection Agency Bd .............................
........ Intoxicating Liquors ............................................
........ Ore Buyers' License ..............................................
Abstractors' Bd. of Examiners ..................................
Accountancy Examining Bd ..................................
Bd. of Barber Examiners ............................................
Bd. of Examiners of Basic Sciences .....................
Chiropractors' Examining Bd ................................
Bd. of Dental Examiners ..........................................
Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalm ....................
Bd. of Medical Examiners ......................................
Motor Vehicle Dept ...................................................
Bd. of Optometric Examiners ...............................
Board of Pharm acy ........................................................
Real Estate Brokers' Exam. Bd ............................
Bd. of Veterinary Examiners ......................................
Agricultural Comm ...................................................
Comm'r. of Agriculture ..............................................
Dairy Com m 'r .................................................................
Director of M arkets ......................................................
Dept. of H ealth ..............................................................
Board of H ealth ............................................................
Colo. Tax Com m .............................................................
Director of Revenue (Income Tax) ..........................
(Sales
........ Tax) ......................................................
........ (Motor Fuel Tax) ..............................................
Motor Vehicle Dealers' Adm .......................................
Inheritance Tax Comm'r .............................................
Bd. of Standards of Child Care .............................

20
60

Both
Both
Both
Both

After final order
20 days
60

Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Take Testimo )ny
Take Testimo ny
Both
Both
Both

20
varies
............
90 days

Give Oaths ny
Take Testimo
Both
Both

£0........

ny

Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both

ny

£0."

............

....

io.

Both
Take Testimo
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both
Both

90"
20
10
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AGENCIES AND PROCEDURES
Method of Appeal

To district court.
To district court, for a restraining order.
To district court, by the person aggrieved.
To a Governor's Board if license is refused.
To Supreme Court by certiorari.
For refusal to grant license, by certiorari to district court.
For suspension or revocation of license, to Comm. to review initial order.
To the Comm., then to the district court of place of injury.
To three arbitrators in county in which appeal arises.
To district court in which the party resides, or to a mediation board
To the Commission, then to the proper district court.
To Commission, then to Denver dist. court or dist. court in place of injury.
To proper district court, but appeal "may" be taken to Commission first.
Most unusual type appeal is de novo review by Denver district court.
De novo trial before Justice of Peace, county, or district courts.

To district court de novo.
To district court.
To district court or Comm.; rehearing by Comm. optional within 10 days.
........................

...............................................................................................................

........................................................................................................................................

Certiorari to any court of competent jurisdiction.
De novo to dist. court; appeal suspends revocation until court decision.
De novo to district court.
To any court of competent jurisdiction.
To district court.
Certiorari to district court of City and County of Denver.
To district court.
........................................................................................................................................
De novo to district court where licensee resides, then to Supreme Court.
To district court; agency may review prior findings upon request.
To district and county courts.
De novo to "courts".
To the Board, for reinstatement.
To district court.
........................................................................................................................................
...................................................................

.....................................................................

............................

....................................................................

•........................................

To district court of county of residence, or to Denver district court.
......................................................................................................................................---..-

o.u.- -t- s-----------

To district court of county in which taxpayer resides, de novo.
Certiorari to district court in Denver, then to the Supreme Court.
Action must be filed within 30 days in dist. court in order to contest levy.
Original action in district court.
To district court of proper county, or to Supreme Court by writ of error.
Appeal to proper court.
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SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
ROBERT G. ROGERS *

The material in this paper is limited to the scope of judicial
review, by the appropriate appellate courts of Colorado, of the
acts and findings of administrative agencies of the state. The
material herein is further limited to a study of the scope of review with respect to the following specific problems: (1) Jurisdiction of Subject Matter; (2) Statutory Authority and Power
of Agency; and (3) Review of Evidence and Findings of Fact.
Other matters such as notice and opportunity to be heard and
the requirements of a fair hearing are covered elsewhere in this
study of Colorado Administrative Law.
JURISDICTION OF SUBJECT MATTER

It is logical to assume that the first consideration of a court
of review would be to determine whether the agency involved in
the litigation had jurisdiction over the subject matter with which
it had dealt.
There appears to be no doubt that Colorado courts are completely logical and orthodox in this respect as is illustrated by the
case of Speers v. Public Utilities Comm.' In that case the petitioner, Speers, instituted an action before the Public Utilities
Commission alleging that utility rates being charged him were
excessive and unreasonable. The Commission dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction, and the dismissal was upheld by
the district court. The Supreme Court, in holding the decision of
the district court, did so solely on the grounds that the Commission lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit.
The court found that under the Constitution of the State of
Colorado and the Charter of the City and County of Denver the
latter was given power to fix the rates in question and that consequently the Public Utilities Commission was without jurisdiction in the matter.
The question of jurisdiction again arose in a case involving
the same petitioner and the State Board of Health. In this case
also the question of jurisdiction of the subject matter was considered by the Colorado district and supreme courts and a determination was made that the administrative
tribunal did have juris2
diction of the matter in question.
In Glenwood Light and Water Co. v. City of Glenwood Springs,8
the Supreme Court states, "In determining that the P.U.C. exceeded
its authority (jurisdiction) the district court was acting within
its authority."
• Student, University of Denver College of Law.
'100 Colo. 369, 67 P. 2d 1029.
' Speers Free Clinic & Hospital for Poor Children, Inc. v. State Board of
Health, 220 P. 2d 872.
'79 Colo. 307, 245 P. 720.
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It does not appear to be necessary to belabor the point further
that the scope of review of the courts in reviewing the actions of
administrative agencies does extend to a determination of whether
or not the agency had jurisdiction of the subject matter in the
first instance. This is, of course, standard, orthodox law, and
there is no more variance with respect to its application in cases
involving administrative agencies than there is in any other type
of litigation.
STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND POWER OF AGENCY

Another apparently well settled and orthodox result is reached
with respect to extending the scope of review to include a review
of the actions of the administrative tribunal to determine if its
actions, awards or orders are within the limitations imposed upon
it by statute or otherwise.
A typical case, in which the reviewing court determined that
although the tribunal had jurisdiction of the subject matter, its
order could not stand because it was violative of the statutory
authority of the agency, is Sapero v. State Board of Medical Examiners.4 The Supreme Court found in that case that the revocation of the license of the petitioning physician by the board was
in excess of the authority of the board as conferred on it by the
applicable statute. The advertising by the petitioner, which was
the important issue in the case, was held not to be an infringement of the provisions of the applicable statute but was an infringement of "imaginary legislation" of the Board of Medical
Examiners. The court found no power in the board to promulgate
this "imaginary legislation" nor to revoke licenses of physicians
who transgressed such "legislation." The board here clearly exceeded its authority by attempting to legislate. The court states
that the board "abused its discretion."
There does not appear to be here, however, any "abuse of
discretion" as the board had absolutely no authority to proceed
along the lines it chose. There was no exercise of discretion but
a bald attempt on the part of the board to usurp the function of
the legislature, create its own law, then enforce it. This seems to
be purely a case in which the administrative tribunal clearly exceeds its authority.
Further illustration of the principal that the scope of review
extends to determine whether the acts of the administrative agency
are in excess of its authority is the case of 0. P. Skaggs v. Nixon. 5
In this case the Supreme Court reviewed the evidence on which the
administrative tribunal had made a finding and determined that
the finding was contrary to the uncontradicted evidence. In such
case, the court said, the findings of the tribunal are in excess of
its power.
In accord with the principal of review set out above is Indus90 Colo. 568, 11 P. 2d 555.
' 97 Colo. 314, 50 P. 2d 55.
4
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trial Commission v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,6 wherein
the court said, "An award of the Industrial Commission may be
set aside if the commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction."
In the Speers Free Clinic case, supra, the court reviewed the
evidence presented before the commission and determined that the
Board of Health exceeded its authority by "attempting to usurp
the functions of the legislature and set up a law of its own." The
board had ignored the statutory provisions for licensing and had
substituted its own provisions.
It appears then that the court will determine if the administrative tribunal has, in its functions, remained within the boundaries set out by applicable statutes, determining whether the
agency has exceeded its authority by making findings on evidence
which is uncontradicted, which findings are as a matter of law in
error (0. P. Skaggs case, supra) or if it has attempted to substitute its own legislation for that of the State Legislature. It will
further consider any other matters which in its determination may
constitute an attempt by the tribunal to act in excess of its power
or in abuse of its discretion.
REVIEW OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND EVIDENCE
One of the more difficult questions to answer is to what extent
the reviewing court will extend the scope of its review with respect
to disturbing the findings of fact of an administrative agency and
to the reviewing of the evidence on which the findings of fact
were made.
One instance in which the court reviewed the evidence and
the findings of fact based thereon has been discussed briefly with
reference to another subject (Skagg case, supra). In that case
the court examined the evidence and then viewed the finding of
fact in the light of the evidence. By this process they determined
that the evidence was uncontradicted and that the finding of fact,
when viewed in the light of the evidence, was as a matter of law
erroneous and could not stand. It is to be noted that the evidence
in this case was uncontradicted. In such cases the court, in reviewing the action of the commission, is passing upon a question of
law and not making a finding of fact.
Thus in Meyers v. Lakewood County,7 the court says:
Where there is no conflict in the testimony and it
appears the award . . . is based upon unwarranted inferences or improper application of the law, the court
may set aside the findings of the commission.
In Arvas v. McNeil Coal Corp.,8 the question at issue was
essentially whether or not the claimant was suffering from a certain disease. The evidence pertinent to this point presented before
the administrative agency consisted of the testimony of three
678 Colo. 267, 241 P. 729.

1220 P. 2d 371.
8 119 Colo. 289, 203 P. 2d 906.
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physicians. One such witness said that the claimant was suffering
from the disease in question; one said that he did not know; the
third said "he might be." On the basis of this testimony, the commission found against the claimant. The court on review stated
that they could not allow this order to stand. Their reason was
that since there was no conflict in the evidence on the point at
issue the court was not bound by the findings of the commission
but could determine as a matter of law what the findings should
have been.
In Industrial Commission v. Elkas,9 the important issue was
whether or not one John Denny was the same person as Christos
Demetrious Elkas. The court reviewed the finding of the commission that they were not one and the same person and stated
that the evidence showed that they were. The court stated that
the evidenced showed, "conclusively, definitely and unequivocally"
that they were one and the same person. Then the court went
on to state:
The award [of the administrative tribunal] is to be
treated like the verdict of a jury and set aside when there
is no evidence to support it . . . whether an award is supported by evidence is such question [question of law]
and may be considered on review.
In the 0. P. Skaggs case, supra, the court nicely sums up the
problem of no evidence [or uncontradicted evidence] by saying:
In such circumstances a court in reviewing the action
of the commission is passing upon a question of law and
not making a finding of fact and consequently is not usurping the fact finding power of the commission.
REVIEW WHERE EVIDENCE Is CONFLICTING
It appears to be in order now to consider the attitude of the
court with respect to cases where the agency has made a finding
of fact, and the evidence in the case is conflicting.
In Zuzich v. Leyden Lignite Company,' the court stated, "We
have held uniformly that the findings of the Industrial Commission
must be accepted by the courts if there is any substantial evidence
to support them."
Similar statements appeared invariably in all cases reviewed
by the writer, where there was a conflict in the evidence presented
before the administrative tribunal. It appears from this and similar statements that the court on review will examine the evidence
which was presented to the tribunal and then will test this evidence by some standard to determine if it will support the finding
of the commission. In the Zuzich case, the court says:
It becomes our duty to examine the evidence introduced at the hearing to determine whether the record con9 73 Colo. 475,
10120 Colo. 21,
Colo. 238, 74 P. 2d
v. Ind. Comm, 104

216 P. 521.
206 P. 2d 833. See also: American Mining Co. v. Zupet, 101
281; Ind. Comm. v. Valdez, 101 Colo. 482, 74 P. 2d 710; White
Colo. 372, 90 P. 2d 960.
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tains sufficient competent and relevant evidence, even
though a conflict exists therein, to support the commission's [findings].
In this case when referring to the evidence which they must
find in order to uphold the findings of the commission, the court
describes such evidence by using the following words in various
parts of the case: "sufficient, competent and relevant evidence";
"any substantial evidence"; and "evidence . . . from which it [the
tribunal] could draw a reasonable inference." In Jarret v. Cruse,
Director of Internal Revenue," the court stated, "there was 'ample'
evidence to support the findings of the [agency]." In the Skaggs
case, supra, it is expressed thusly: "where there is 'competent
evidence' to support its [the tribunals] findings, they are binding
on all courts." In other cases there are various modifications and
combinations of the words used above, with the expression, "any
substantial evidence," seeming to dominate.
What is competent and relevant evidence is the subject of
a separate study and is not considered here. Assuming that the
evidence is relevant, what degree of persuasiveness must it attain
in order to support the findings of the agency? An analysis of
the cases in which this problem is presented leads to the conclusion
that the standard of measurement of *the requisite quantity of
evidence needed to support the findings is essentially and necessarily nebulous and subjective. It appears that the evidence must
be substantial in nature and more than a scintilla in quantity. Yet
it does not have to be a preponderance. Neither does it have to
equal contradictory evidence. Somewhere beyond the scintilla and
short of equality lies the minimum line. It appears to be a line
that is varied in position depending on the facts of the individual
case and the subjective reasoning of the particular court. It is
not suggested that it could be otherwise since by its very nature
it defies specific limitations.
Where there is found this sufficient quantity of evidence to
support the findings of the commission, the courts will not disturb
such findings, even though had the court been the fact finding
agency it could or probably would have found otherwise. 1 2 But if
the evidence is insufficient to support the finding, the finding by
the tribunal will not be allowed to stand by the court. 13
It is to be noted that the scope of review is sometimes set out
in the statute which creates the administrative tribunal. Typical
14
of this is the statute relating to the Public Utilities Commission.
That statute limits the scope of review of the reviewing court to
determining whether the order of the commission is just and reasonable and if the findings of the commission are in accordance
with the evidence (in so far as we are here concerned). Does the
11117 Colo. 206, 185 P. 2d 787.
"Clayton Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 93 Colo. 145, 25 P. 2d 170;
Moffat Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 108 Colo. 338, 118 P. 2d 769.
"State Civil Service Comm. v. Hovey, 38 Colo. 169, 293 P. 338.
"Vol. 4, ch. 137, sec. 52, Coi.o. STAT. ANN.
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wording of that statute require more evidence than that required
in the previous discussion? In A. T. & S. F. Railway Co. v. Public
Utilities 1 the Colorado Supreme Court stated: "[We are permitted] to determine whether the order of the commission is just
and reasonable, and whether its conclusion is in accordance with
the evidence." Commenting on this in Public Utilities Commission
v. City of Loveland,'0 the Supreme Court said that the above statement was correct if the writer meant "substantial evidence." This
would seem to indicate that the requirements as to evidence under
this statute are the same as those previously discussed. This is
the opinion of the writer with respect to this and the other statutes in Colorado which limit the scope of review. It appears that
the statutes which specifically limit the scope of review simply
reiterate the principles already established in this field with respect to evidence, although their wording might make it appear
otherwise.
That the requirements as to evidence under this statute are
the same as those discussed earlier is further sustained by the
Public Utilities Commission v. City of Loveland 'T case wherein the
court quotes with approval a decision of the United States Supreme
Court handed down in the case of Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific Railway Co.' 8 in which the court said essentially the same thing the Colorado Supreme Court said in the City
of Loveland case. In Denver & Salt Lake Railway Co. v. Chicago,
Burlington and Quincy Railway Co., 19 the Colorado court stated
that it was not prohibited from considering the evidence to determine if the findings of the commission were in accordance with
the evidence. The court then went on to say, "This includes
whether there is a substantial conflict in the evidence which, if
there is, we agree would prohibit us from overruling the commission's findings based thereon." The court continued, "Our conclusions are supported by the highest tribunal in the land." It then
quoted to sustain that statement the case of I. C. C. v. Louisville
& Nashville Railway Co. 20 wherein the Supreme Court of the
United States stated:
Administrative orders ... are void if the finding was
contrary to the undisputable character of the evidence or
the facts proved do not as a matter of law support the
order made. The court will not review the commission's
findings of fact by passing on the credibility of witnesses
or conflicts in the testimony. But the legal effect of the
evidence is a question of law.
1568 Colo. 92, 188 P. 747.
87 Colo. 556, 289 P. 1090.
" Note 16, supra.
18222 U. S. 541, 32 S. Ct. 108.
,9 96 Colo. 334, 43 P. 2d 999.
227 U. S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185.
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